There are few things in life that I dread more than relocating. I am sure I am not alone; humans are creatures of habit. The status quo<\/em> brings a false sense of security with it. We naturally distrust sudden events. It is understandable for some to be wary of the existence of unusual events like miracles and label as \u201cdim-witted\u201d those who believe in them.<\/p>\n Philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) argued against miracles and was extremely pleased with his logic;[1]<\/a> but are his arguments sound? Is it reasonable to think that the identification of miracles is viable and possible? The answer is yes, and in this document I will analyze Hume\u2019s critique against miracles and demonstrate that his arguments\u2014while rhetorically brilliant\u2014fail to achieve its purpose.<\/p>\n The Christian worldview sits on the foundation of one particular miracle: the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. But if miracles are practical impossibilities or are\u2014as Hume suggests\u2014undetectable in spite of overwhelming evidence, then we have no way to know if Christianity is true. Miracles\u2014in the proper context\u2014would be evidence of God endorsing new revelation.<\/p>\n In his two-part essay \u201cOf Miracles,\u201d Hume seems to sit on top of an argumentative stronghold shooting cannonballs to obliterate all credibility on miraculous claims. To this day, those cannons still resonate in the circles of secular universities and are used to label the religiously inclined as \u201c\u2026a barbarous and ignorant people.\u201d[2]<\/a><\/p>\n Hume did not attack the possibility of the occurrence<\/em> of miracles, but the possibility of the identification<\/em> of miracles. He concludes that \u201ca miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion.\u201d[3]<\/a> This conclusion is reached in 2 parts. The first part\u2014also known as Hume\u2019s \u201cin-principle\u201d argument\u2014is concerned with showing that the evidence against the occurrence of a miracle far outweighs the evidence in favor of the occurrence. The second part\u2014also known as Hume\u2019s \u201cin fact\u201d argument\u2014is concerned with showing that the evidence for miracles is extremely weak.<\/p>\n It is vital to understand if Hume succeeded to destroy the credibility on miracles, and all hope for Christianity to be a viable worldview.<\/p>\n Part of the problem we face with Hume\u2019s essay is the ambiguity of some of his terms. Hume provides two definitions for miracles: \u201cA miracle is a violation of the laws of nature.\u201d[4]<\/a> and \u201cA miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.\u201d[5]<\/a> We can gain some clarity from philosopher of physics John Earman as to what is normally<\/em> understood by a miracle as defined by Hume and why a better definition is needed for his argument to even take off:<\/p>\n [L]et us say that a law L expresses a law of nature if L is a law statement and it is true. A miracle statement<\/em> M is a statement that expresses an exception to a true law statement L in the sense that M asserts the occurrence of an event or particular state of affairs, which assertion is incompatible with L. The conundrum should be obvious: If Newton\u2019s \u2018Second Law\u2019 does in fact express a law, then the statement M that an apple jumped off of the table even though the net impressed force on the apple was zero is a miracle statement; but by definition, M cannot be true.[6]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n At face value, Hume\u2019s definition begs the question. Philosophers have attempted to somehow improve Hume\u2019s definition to better characterize his arguments and avoid circular logic. This, however, runs the risk of misrepresenting Hume\u2019s position. To be fair and leave Hume\u2019s argument open for discussion in the most honoring manner, we will define a Hume miracle<\/em> as a \u201cviolation of an apparent law of nature, or as Hume later says, of \u2018the most established\u2019 laws of nature.\u201d[7]<\/a> But even with a revised version of Hume\u2019s definition for miracles, his arguments still fail to accomplish what he intended, as we will see.<\/p>\n According to philosopher David Johnson[8]<\/a>, Hume\u2019s main argument can be faithfully extracted from the passages below:<\/p>\n [I]n order to increase the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail.<\/p>\n A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.<\/p>\n And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite<\/p>\n proof, which is superior.<\/p>\n [N]o testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish.[9]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Hume uses brilliant rhetoric to seemingly demolish any hope of believing in miracles. One has to wonder, though, what exactly he means by \u201cmarvelous\u201d and \u201cproof\u201d, but even without clearly defined terms, from these passages, we can deduct that, if a witness of impeccable character (for the sake of argument), sincere and reliable, claims to have observed the occurrence of a violation of an apparent and established law of nature, we must consider this as \u201cproof\u201d. On the other side of the scale, we also have \u201cproof\u201d based on \u201cinfallible experience\u201d that has \u201cestablished those laws.\u201d Thus the scales are in perfect equilibrium and a \u201cwise man\u201d should not concede the claim as a miracle.<\/p>\n This attitude is prevalent in society today. It is \u201cunwise\u201d to believe any of this miracle \u201cgibberish\u201d without much thought or investigation of the alleged evidence, but that is precisely what provides insight to human experience; the very same experience that Hume assumes as \u201cinfallible\u201d. I remember reading an article[10]<\/a> recently about meteorite accidents and insurance policies. It made me think about the first time<\/em> humans witnessed a meteorite crash. Such an event, however improbable and outside of the realm of \u201cuniform experience\u201d, according to Hume, should never be believed. This includes other isolated and improbable events in science like the big-bang, the discovery of the Higgs boson or the advent of the first biological life-form. In fact, human knowledge and discovery would halt if limited to past experience. Hume\u2019s objection seems\u2014if not unscientific\u2014anti-science. Simply put, if human intellect is capable of discerning highly improbable and previously unknown events in nature then it is also possible<\/em> for humans to identify a miracle\u2014given enough evidence and adequate context\u2014with a reasonable degree of confidence. The fact that an event may occur, but we are never justified to believe it, is not axiomatic; it needs evidence and support to be sustained.<\/p>\n Hume also appears to commit to the idea that even if a miracle did occur, we are not justified to believe it. Since, for example, \u201cdeath occurs over an over and resurrection only on rare occasions, he simple adds up all the deaths against the very few alleged resurrections and rejects the latter.\u201d[11]<\/a> Here, Normal Geisler correctly points out that Hume has committed the consensus gentium[12]<\/strong><\/a><\/em> fallacy.<\/p>\n If God exists, then miracles are possible\u2014even if improbable\u2014and the evidence for each has to be analyzed even if the skeptic may, a-priori, discard any miraculous claim as nonsensical purely on philosophical basis or even personal bias.<\/p>\n Much could be said about probabilities and miracles in Hume\u2019s context. Earman dedicates tree chapters on probabilities in his published work as well as an appendix on the subject.[13]<\/a> Timothy and Lydia McGrew also argue convincingly against Hume\u2019s logic on probabilities.[14]<\/a> After careful analysis of probabilistic theory \u201cwe must recognize that and argument based on probabilities can never be more than that\u2014a probabilistic argument. While it can provide a rule of thumb<\/em> that tells us how the plausibility of one explanation compares with another, it surely cannot provide and absolute guarantee<\/em> of where the truth lies.\u201d[15]<\/a> After all if miracles were highly probable events we would include them as part of the laws of nature as they would cease to be singular events. We would just miss them altogether!<\/p>\n Hume\u2019s \u201cin-principle\u201d argument begs the question[16]<\/a> if taken at face value, or simply relies on fallacious argumentation. For a better perspective on the treatment of extraordinary events\u2014including miracle claims\u2014we have to agree with Earman when he writes:<\/p>\n I acknowledge that the opinion is of the kind whose substantiation requires no philosophical argumentation and pompous solemnities about extraordinary claims requiring extraordinary proofs, but rather difficult and delicate empirical investigations<\/em>\u2026into the details of particular cases.[17]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Events of this kind are better left in the hands of historians. We need to shed philosophical presuppositions and bias to focus on the mere facts.<\/p>\n In the first part of his essay, Hume admits to \u201chave been a great too liberal\u201d in his concession that \u201cthere never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence.\u201d[18]<\/a> In the second part of his essay Hume presents four objections based on psychohistorical grounds, that, in his mind, should be sufficient to show that the evidence for miracles is in fact extremely weak and incredible: First, no miracle has been witnessed by enough educated and honest men in an important part of the world.[19]<\/a> Second, humans crave for the supernatural and will accept nonsensical miraculous stories in contradiction to their conventional wisdom. Third, miracles mainly \u201cabound among the ignorant and barbarous nations\u201d[20]<\/a>, and fourth, reports of miracles in all religions end up cross-canceling each other, leaving all religious believes mutually unsupported and equally false.<\/p>\n None of Hume\u2019s maxims\u2014individually or taken together\u2014form a strong case against miracles: The first clause can only be true if all alleged miracle witnesses of all times have been taken under scrutiny and found not only uneducated and dishonest but also false witnesses. Being uneducated and unlearned does not necessarily make a witness \u201ca-priori\u201d unreliable. This is just a bare assertion devoid of evidence.<\/p>\n As for the second clause; even if humans crave for the supernatural, it does not follow that all will accept miraculous claims without evidence, even if some people do. This point makes nothing to undermine the historicity or miraculous events.<\/p>\n Third point: I was raised in a third-world country. I have to agree with Hume that miraculous stories indeed do abound in \u201cbarbarous\u201d nations; but again, this point does not undermine historical research, for even in under-developed countries\u2014if God exists\u2014he can act if he wants to, and all alleged miracles can be sifted through a historical mesh of research. Dismissing the uneducated as unreliable is arguing ad hominem.<\/p>\n Hume\u2019s fourth point (that miracles happen in many religions, thus cancel each other) has some merit. Hume here implies that not all religions can be true\u2014and he is right\u2014but that does not necessarily mean they are all false. \u201cCounterfeit currency does not negate the existence of the genuine.\u201d[21]<\/a> Defeaters come in handy in this case. In our legal system, when witnesses provide conflicting testimony, lawyers do not simply throw up their hands and go home. They try to overpower the opponents\u2019 testimony\u2014known as a rebutting defeater<\/em>\u2014or to sabotage and raise doubts on the rival\u2019s evidence\u2014known as undercutting defeater<\/em>. Both of these defeaters are relevant in miracle assessment of different religions and can be used actively in historical research.[22]<\/a> Ancient documents claiming miracles can be subjected to textual criticism, dating, archeology and general reliability as potential defeaters.<\/p>\n It is noteworthy that, after postulating his four points against miracles, Hume does not analyze the evidence for miracles in the Gospels or even the resurrection. Instead he focuses his attention in favor of other less-known miracles from Vespasian that he expects his reader to find credible (ironically) in order to nullify the Gospel miracles. It is unlikely that Christianity\u2019s miracles slept his mind, since, in the beginning of his essay, he clearly states that the authority of scripture or of tradition \u201cis founded merely in the testimony of the Apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Savior.\u201d[23]<\/a><\/p>\n Apparently Hume attempts to discredit Christianity and the resurrection, by proxy, confronting miracle against miracle to make each other null. Timothy and Lydia McGrew here identify two unspoken premises from Hume\u2019s reasoning:<\/p>\n 1) that the evidence for these alternative miracles is in every way equal or superior to that for the resurrection, and 2) that the events thus reported are not worthy of credit. Hume\u2019s rhetoric does, indirectly, suggest that he wants to endorse both claims, though he never supports either with a direct argument, and it would be impossible without supporting the first without considering the evidence for the resurrection directly.[24]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Hume could have spent the rest of his essay refuting the Christian miracles with the known facts directly rather than exercise a trial by proxy, trying to give credence to the miracles of Vespasian as reported by Tacitus\u2014which can be easily discredited on historical grounds.[25]<\/a><\/p>\n These four points carry some weight, \u201cbut the fact remains\u201d, Craig adds, \u201cthat these general considerations cannot be used to decide the historicity or any particular miracle.\u201d[26]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n We have to thank Hume for giving us fair warning against being gullible and to the dangers of believing untested and improbable accounts without further analysis. He had the gift to identify important problems and to dissect them in provocative ways. But the arguments he presented, fell short to accomplish the goal he had in mind when analyzed under a clinical eye and stripped of all rhetorical brilliance and ambiguity. Hume warned us that \u201cEloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason and reflection: but addressing itself entirely to the fancy of the affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their understanding.\u201d[27]<\/a> In this respect, Hume was right, but he should have listened to his own warning before writing \u201cOf Miracles\u201d instead of flattering himself prematurely.<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> \u201cI flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures.\u201d David Hume. \u201cOf Miracles,\u201d in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, <\/em>of The Philosophical Works of David Hume, <\/em>ed. Adam and Charles Black, vol. IV (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1854), 125.<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Ibid.,<\/em> 149.<\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Ibid., 146.<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Ibid., 130.<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Ibid., 150.<\/p>\n [6]<\/a> John Earman, Hume\u2019s Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles<\/em>, (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 12.<\/p>\n [7]<\/a> David Johnson, Hume, holism and miracles<\/em>, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 17.<\/p>\n [8]<\/a> Ibid., 16.<\/p>\n [9]<\/a> Hume, The Philosophical Works of David Hume,<\/em> 130.<\/p>\n [10]<\/a> Victor Luckerson, \u201cIf a Meteorite Hits Your Home, Are You Insured?\u201d, Time Magazine Online, http:\/\/business.time.com\/2013\/02\/15\/if-a-meteorite-hits-your-home-are-you-insured\/<\/a> (accessed March 28, 2013).<\/p>\n [11]<\/a> Normal L. Geisler, Miracles and the Modern Mind: A defense of Biblical Miracles<\/em> (Matthews, NC: Bastion Books, 2012), 24.<\/p>\n [12]<\/a> Something is true because most people believe it.<\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Earman, Hume\u2019s Abject Failure<\/em>, 75.<\/p>\n [14]<\/a> William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, ed., \u201cThe Argument from Miracles\u201d, The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology<\/em> (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 640-50.<\/p>\n [15]<\/a> Nicholas Humprey, Leaps of Faith: Science, Miracles, and the Search for Supernatural Consolation<\/em> (New York: Copernicus, 1999), 77 (emphasis added).<\/p>\n [16]<\/a> \u201cNow of course we have to agree with Hume that if there is absolutely \u2018uniform experience\u2019 against miracles, if in other words they never happened, why then they never have. Unfortunately we know the experience against them to be uniform only if we know that all the reports of them are false. And we can know all the reports to be false only if we already know already that miracles have never occurred. In fact, we are arguing in circle.\u201d C. S. Lewis, Miracles<\/em> (New York, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001), 162.<\/p>\n [17]<\/a> Earman, Hume\u2019s Abject Failure<\/em>, 61 (emphasis added).<\/p>\n [18]<\/a> Hume, The Philosophical Works of David Hume,<\/em> 132.<\/p>\n [19]<\/a> Paraphrased from Ibid.<\/p>\n [20]<\/a> Ibid., 135.<\/p>\n [21]<\/a> Michael R. Licona, The Resurection of Jesus<\/em> (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2010), 146.<\/p>\n [22]<\/a> Paraphrased from R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas, ed., \u201cMiracles in the World Religions\u201d, In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God\u2019s Action in History<\/em>, (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 200.<\/p>\n [23]<\/a> Hume, The Philosophical Works of David Hume,<\/em> 124.<\/p>\n [24]<\/a> Craig and Moreland, The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, <\/em>654.<\/p>\n [25]<\/a> \u201cThe two cures mentioned seem to have been suggested by two [to be] reported in the Gospel of Mark; in particular, the use of spittle to anoint the eyes of a blind man bears a striking resemblance to the cure at Bethsaida recounted in Mark 8:23. If so, the whole affair supports the ancient tradition, found in Eusebius, Epiphanius, and Jerome, that Mark published copies of his Gospel at Alexandria. The publication would have had to be at least a few years prior to Vespasian\u2019s arrival there ca. AD 69. Thus Hume\u2019s example turns under his hand in a way that he could not have anticipated. The very similarity between the cures attributed to Vespasian and those of Christ lends additional support to the claim that the Gospel accounts were published much earlier than skeptical biblical scholarship would like to allow.\u201d Ibid., 656.<\/p>\nMiracles: Why do they matter?<\/h1>\n
Hume, Miracles and Ambiguity<\/h1>\n
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Hume\u2019s \u201cIn Principle\u201d Argument<\/h1>\n
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Hume\u2019s \u201cIn Fact\u201d Arguments<\/h1>\n
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Final Thoughts<\/h1>\n